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I. INTRODUCTION
The Idaho Motor Transport Association, Inc. ("ITA"), as amicus curiae, hereby
provides its brief in support of Western Home Transport, Inc.' s ("Western") appeal from the
decision of the Industrial Commission of the State of Idaho (the "Commission"). The ITA's
mission is to serve and represent the interests of the trucking industry in the State of Idaho.
The ITA is interested in the present matter because the Court's decision will have a direct
impact on the trucking industry in Idaho as the owner-operator model is an integral component
of the industry.
ITA' s purpose in submitting its own brief in this matter is not simply to rep low ground
that has already been covered by Western in its well-written briefs. ITA seeks to provide the
Court with additional perspectives regarding the historical background, broader implications,
and legal rationale supporting the reversal of the Court's holding in Giltner, Inc. v. Idaho

Departmento/Commerce and Labor, 145 Idaho 415, 179 P.3d 1071 (2008). ITA understands
that the current matter is on appeal from the decision of the Commission. However, the
holding in Giltner is at the heart of the Commission's decision.
The task before the Court is to determine whether owner-operators engaged by Western
to haul property for shippers should be classified as employees or independent contractors for
purposes of the Idaho Employment Security Act. Under the Idaho Employment Security Act,
compensation paid to employees is subject to unemployment insurance taxes, while
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remuneration paid to independent contractors is not. Idaho Code § 72-1316. The statutory
exemption for independent contractors reads as follows:
(4)
Services performed by an individual for remuneration shall, for
the purposes of the employment security law, be covered employment
unless it is shown:
(a)
That the worker has been and will continue to be free from
control or direction in the performance of his work, both under his
contract of service and in fact; and
(b)
That the worker is engaged in an independently
established trade, occupation, profession, or business.
Idaho Code § 72-1316( 4 ).
For convenience of reference, the first prong of the statutory test is herein referred to
as the "control" prong, and the second prong of the statutory test is herein referred to as the
"independence" prong.
In its Decision and Order, the Commission found that Westem's relationship with its
owner-operators satisfied the control prong. (R. at 28.) That finding has not been challenged
by Respondent and therefore should be deemed settled. (See generally, Respondent's Br.)
Both Appellant and Respondent direct the Court's attention to the independence prong.
Appellant urges the Court to recognize that the facts of this case show that its owner-operators
are engaged in an independently established business. Respondent relies on the Court's
holding in Giltner for the proposition that the owner-operators cannot be engaged in an
independently established business because they operate under Western' s operating authority.

2
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Appellant acknowledges that the owner-operators operate under Western' s operating authority
as required by federal law; however, Appellant urges the Court to reverse Giltner because, in
addition to Appellant's other arguments, Giltner is inconsistent with longstanding Idaho case
law that was not expressly overruled by Giltner, and Giltner has an unwise and unjust impact
on independent owner-operators and motor carriers. (Appellant's Reply Br. 4-6.)
ITA agrees with Appellant's view and encourages the Court to overturn its holding in
Giltner because, as discussed below, (i) Giltner is manifestly wrong, (ii) Giltner has proven
to be unjust and unwise, and (iii) reversing Giltner would vindicate obvious principles oflaw
and remedy a continued injustice.

II. BACKGROUND
A.

THE HISTORY OF THE OWNER-OPERATOR MODEL.
1.

The Origin of Lease Agreements Between Owner-Operators and Motor
Carriers and Operating Authority.

For as long as there have been trucks, there have been individuals who own and operate
trucks for commercial purposes. Initially, these individuals acted as motor carriers simply by
buying trucks and agreeing to haul goods for others for a fee. Douglas C. Grawe, Have Truck,
Will Drive: The Trucking Industry and the Use ofIndependent Owner-Operators Over Time,
35 Transp. L.J. 115, 117 (2008). Before long, the market had become so saturated with
competitive trucking services that rates and profits for such services drastically plummeted.

3
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Id. To stabilize the industry (in part by limiting new entrants), the federal government passed
the Motor Carrier Act of 1935 ("Motor Carrier Act"). Id. at 117-18.
Under the Motor Carrier Act, the authority of the Interstate Commerce Commission
("ICC") was extended to govern interstate trucking operations. Id. By the same Act, motor
carriers were required to obtain a certificate of authority from the ICC to conduct motor carrier
services. Id. at 120;seealsoAm. TruckingAss'nsv. UnitedStates,344 U.S.298,302(1953).
In order to obtain a certificate, motor carriers had to prove both that they were "fit, willing, and
able to perform the proposed operations," and that their operations were required by public
necessity. Grawe, supra, at 120. These requirements created a substantial barrier to new
owner-operators seeking to enter the industry, because the small entrepreneurs were not in a
position to negotiate the regulatory complexities of the ICC. Id. at 120-21.
In response, owner-operators began to "lease" their equipment to motor carriers that
were already familiar with the ICC's complex proceedings and who were certified under the
ICC's regulations. Id. at 122. Under these lease agreements, an owner-operator leases its
trucks to motor carriers and provides driver services while the motor carriers provide the
operating authority. Id. at 122. These lease agreements were mutually advantageous. They
enabled the owner-operators to stay in business while enabling the motor carriers to reduce
their operating expenses. Id. at 126; see also Am. Trucking Ass 'ns, 344 U.S. at 306.
Motor carriers' use of non-owned equipment through such lease agreements has been
long-recognized by the United States Supreme Court as lawful. Am. Trucking Ass 'ns, 344 U.S.
4
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at 303-04. Congress has also twice recognized this leasing practice as legitimate, enabling the
use of such leases to thrive in the national motor carrier industry. Agric. Transp. Ass 'n ofTex.
v. King, 349 F.2d 873, 881 (5th Cir. 1965). Notably, since these initial approvals, none of the
ICC (or its successor, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration ("FMCSA")),
Congress, or the United States Supreme Court has revised their view that such leasing practices
are a valid and lawful component of this country's motor carrier network.
2.

Changes to the Lease Agreements: Legal Responsibility for Motor Carriers.

While the leasing agreements between motor carriers and owner-operators were clearly
lawful, the leasing agreements were not always without problems. Early on, some ICClicensed motor carriers sought to use the leasing of vehicles to immunize themselves from
lawsuits stemming from vehicle operations and to avoid safety regulations governing
equipment and drivers. Zeringue v. O'Brien Transp., Inc., 931 So. 2d 377, 379-80 (La. Ct.
App. 2006); Am. Trucking Ass 'ns, 344 U.S. at 304-05; see also Grawe, supra, at 122.
To address these problems, while simultaneously protecting the integrity of trucking
commerce, the ICC promulgated regulations in 1950 governing the leasing arrangements. See
Saullo v. Douglas, 957 So. 2d 80, 83 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007); Zeringue, 931 So. 2d at
379-80); see also Grawe, supra, at 124. The new regulations required motor carriers to
assume legal responsibility for the operation of vehicles leased from owner-operators.
Zeringue, 931 So. 2d at 380. Grawe, supra, at 124; see also Am. Trucking Ass 'ns, 344 U.S.

5
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at 308. The express purpose of these regulations was to ensure safety of operations and the
protection of the public:
It is apparent ... that sound transportation services and the elimination

of the problem of a transfer of operating authority, with its attendant
difficulties of enforcing safety requirements and of fixing financial
responsibility for damage and injuries to shippers and members of the
public, were the significant aims and guideposts in the development of
the comprehensive rules.

Transamerican Freight Lines, Inc. v. Brada Miller Freight Sys., Inc., 423 U.S. 28, 37 (1975)
(emphasis added); see also Am. Trucking Ass 'ns, 344 U.S. at 310, 316. 1

B.

TERMINOLOGY.
In order for the Court to make an informed decision on the present matter, it is critical

that the Court have a clear understanding of the industry terms used herein. The definitions
below will assist the Court in its analysis.

Interstate commerce means trade, traffic, or transportation in the United States (1)
between a place in a State and a place outside of such State (including a place outside of the
United States); (2) between two places in a State through another State or a place outside of
the United States; or (3) between two places in a State as part of trade, traffic, or transportation
originating or terminating outside the State or the United States. 49 C.F.R. § 390.5.

1

These federal regulations applied (and continue to apply) to owner-operators across the United States,
including in Idaho. See 49 U.S.C. § 14102; 49 C.F.R. § 376, et seq.

6
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Intrastate commerce means any trade, traffic, or transportation in any State which is not
described in the term "interstate commerce." 49 C.F.R. § 390.5.
The leasing regulations are set forth in 49 C.F.R. §§ 376.11, 376.12 and control the
contractual relationship (i.e., the lease agreement) between the motor carrier and the owneroperator. The leasing regulations require that the lease be in writing and clearly designates the
responsibility of each party with respect to expenses, including cost of fuel, fuel taxes, empty
mileage, permits of all types, tolls, ferries, detention and accessorial services, base plates and
licenses, and any unused portions of such items. 49 C.F.R. § 376.12(e). As discussed below,
the lease agreement typically provides that these expenses are the responsibility of the owneroperator.
Motor carrier generally means a person providing motor vehicle transportation for
compensation. 49 U.S.C. § 13102(14). In order to transport property in interstate commerce,
a motor carrier must have both a USDOT number and an MC number (which denotes
operating authority) that authorizes transportation of cargo or passengers for compensation.
49 U.S.C. § 13902. Motor carriers are not required to own any trucks. The motor carrier, may,
among other things, contract for loads from shippers, obtain trip permissions, dispatch loads,
ensure compliance with federal and state regulations, arrange for insurance, handle
bookkeeping, own or lease equipment, employ company drivers, and lease trucks from owneroperators who provide drivers for the leased trucks.

7
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Operating authority is the registration required by 49 U.S.C. § 13902 for all motor
carriers operating in interstate commerce. FMCSA operating authority is also referred to as
an "MC", "FF", or "MX" number, depending on the type of authority that is granted. Unlike
the USDOT number application process, a motor carrier may need to obtain multiple operating
authorities to support its planned business operations. Operating authority dictates the type of
operation a motor carrier may run and the cargo it may carry.
An owner-operator is the person or entity (I) to whom legal title to the equipment is
issued; (2) that has the right to exclusive use of the equipment; or (3) has lawful possession of
registered and licensed equipment in that person's or entity's name. 49 C.F.R. § 376.2(d).
Owner-operators are in the business of leasing their trucks to a motor carrier and supplying
drivers to operate the leased trucks. The drivers then transport the cargo for the motor carrier.
The relationship between a motor carrier and an owner-operator is governed by a written lease
that must comply with the leasing regulations.

While leased to the motor carrier, the

equipment is operated under the motor carrier's operating authority. 49 C.F.R. §§ 376.11,
376.12. The owner-operator's direct customer is the motor carrier. Owner-operators are
typically able to determine their own transportation routes, set their own work hours, and
accept or reject any load. The owner-operator is responsible for maintaining and repairing its
equipment. An owner-operator is typically responsible for all other expenses of the equipment
and the motor carrier may charge the owner-operator for any amounts that the motor carrier
advances for the payment of such items.
8
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An owner-operator is distinguishable from a company driver. A company driver is an
employee of the motor carrier. A company driver drives trucks that are owned or leased (other
than through an owner-operator lease) by the motor carrier. A company driver earns a wage
and is not responsible for any expenses related to the truck being operated or the load being
hauled. A company driver has none of the independence that the owner-operator has (e.g., a
company driver is not entitled to refuse a load or determine his or her work hours, routes, etc.).
The shipper sends or receives property that is transported by a motor carrier. 49 U.S.C.
§ 13102( 13 ). The shipper contracts with a motor carrier to transport property to the desired
destination. Shippers do not contract with owner-operators.

C.

STANDARD FOR OVERTURNING PRIOR PRECEDENT.
With regard to the question of whether to overturn Giltner, both Appellant and

Respondent direct the Court's attention to the appropriate grounds, articulated by the Court in

State v. Humphreys, 134 Idaho 657, 8 P.3d 652 (2000), for overruling a prior holding.
The points of inquiry are as follows:
1.

Is the decision manifestly wrong?

2.

Has the holding, over time, proven unjust or unwise?

3.

Will reversal vindicate plain, obvious principles of law and remedy a continued

injustice? Humphreys, 134 Idaho at 660, 8 P.3d at 655.

9
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A finding that any one of the three grounds for reversal exists is sufficient cause for the
Court to overturn a prior decision. Id., 8 P .3d at 65 5. ITA believes, and respectfully urges the
Court to find, that all three grounds support the reversal of Giltner.

III. ARGUMENT
A.

GILTNER SHOULD BE OVERTURNED BECAUSE THE ONE-FACTOR TEST
ARTICULATED IN GILTNER IS MANIFESTLY WRONG.
1.

Giltner mischaracterizes the business of an owner-operator, leading to the
erroneous conclusion that an owner-operator cannot be engaged in an
independently established business if it operates under a motor carrier's
operating authority.

The chief deficiency of the holding in Giltner is that it mischaracterizes the independent
business of an owner-operator. In Giltner, the Court apparently surmised that the business of
the reclassified owner-operators was "[hauling] goods in interstate commerce." Giltner, 145
Idaho at 420, 179 P.3d at 1076. This overbroad characterization of the business of owneroperators is more appropriately ascribed to the business of motor carriers. Owner-operators
are in the different, albeit related, business of leasing equipment to motor carriers and
providing drivers to operate the leased equipment. Owner-operators provide one of many
alternative methods for a motor carrier to conduct its business.
Often, owner-operators are thought of as an individual who owns and drives one truck,
typically under a long-term relationship with a single motor carrier. However, owner-operators
are just as often corporations or limited liability companies as they are individuals and owneroperators may own multiple trucks. Moreover, the principal of the corporation or the limited
l0 -
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liability company may not be the only driver of the owner-operator's equipment or may not
be a driver at all. An entrepreneurial owner-operator may have multiple drivers and trucks,
which may be leased to different motor carriers. Owner-operators switch motor carriers so
often that driver turnover is a constant problem for motor carriers. American Trucking
Associations, Truckload and LTL Driver Turnover Rises in First Quarter of 2013,
http://www.truckline.com/article.aspx?uid=dlfb6033-c5a3-420f-a63d-3f5ac7e836d2

(last

visited Aug. 28, 2013).
An owner-operator needs several distinct things in order to operate its independent
business (none of which include operating authority). First, the owner-operator needs a truck
that it can lease to the motor carrier. This requires a large initial investment of capital to
purchase and license the equipment. Second, the owner-operator needs additional capital for
necessary maintenance and ongoing repairs, communication equipment, and other operating
expenses. Third, the owner-operator must have a driver who is qualified to operate the truck.
A qualified driver must have a commercial driver's license and must meet the safety standards
established by FMSCA and the owner-operator.
Once the owner-operator has these items in place, it is ready to start its business of
leasing equipment to motor carriers and providing drivers to operate the leased equipment.
The owner-operator will never need operating authority to operate this independent business.
In fact, the only time an owner-operator needs operating authority is in the event that it desires
to become a motor carrier in order to contract directly with the shipper or take loads from a
11 -
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broker. In other words, an owner-operator that has its own operating authority and that
contracts directly with a shipper is no longer acting as an owner-operator but is instead acting
as a motor carrier.
An owner-operator has not failed to independently establish a business simply because
it does not have regulatory authority to service the shipper directly (i.e., operating authority).
Shippers are not the owner-operator's direct customer. As previously stated, the owneroperator' s customer is a motor carrier who has operating authority and the relationship with
the shipper.
The motor carrier often needs additional capacity to meet the needs of its shippers. The
independent owner-operator supplies this additional capacity by leasing its trucks and
providing a driver, but it is not required to have operating authority to do so. In fact, even if
the owner-operator has operating authority, it would transport the shipper's property under the
operating authority of the motor carrier pursuant to the leasing regulations. 49 C.F .R. §§
376.11, 376.12. Upon the termination of the relationship between a motor carrier and an
owner-operator, the owner-operator has everything it needs to move on immediately to the next
motor

carrier who

requires

the

services

of the

owner-operator's

independent

business-providing a truck and a qualified, licensed driver.
The failure of the Court to properly characterize the owner-operator's business resulted
in the incorrect holding in Giltner. Correctly characterizing the owner-operator's business
supports the reversal of Giltner.
12 -
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2.

Giltner draws an inexplicable, and in light of relevant industry laws and
circumstances an unsupportable, distinction between owner-operators who
have their own operating authority and those who do not.

As stated above, when an owner-operator leases its equipment to a motor carrier, the
leasing regulations require that such equipment must be operated under the motor carrier's
operating authority while the equipment is leased to the motor carrier. 49 C.F.R. §§ 376.11,
376.12. That being the case, it is hard to understand why Giltner draws a distinction between
owner-operators based on operating authority-reclassifying those that did not have their own
operating authority while not reclassifying those that had their own operating authority. See

Giltner, 145 Idaho at 420, 179 P.3d at 1176.
Given the constraints of the leasing regulations, all of the owner-operators who leased
their trucks to Giltner, whether they had their own operating authority or not, by law must have
operated under Giltner's operating authority for the life of such leases. 49 C.F.R. §§ 376.11,
376.12. It is, therefore difficult to understand why, in this context, an owner-operator with its
own operating authority was classified differently than an owner-operator without its own
operating authority. Because both types of owner-operators were required by law to operate
under Giltner's operating authority, drawing a distinction between them was inappropriate.
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3.

Giltner may lead to a further unsupportable distinction between an owneroperator who hauls for an interstate motor carrier and an owner-operator
who hauls for an intrastate motor carrier, even though both owneroperators engage in the same independently established business.

The flaws in the reasoning of Giltner become more apparent in the context of owneroperators that are engaged by motor carriers that are not operating in interstate commerce.
Such intrastate motor carriers are exempt from the federal requirement of having operating
authority; however, the business of the owner-operator (i.e., leasing a truck to a motor carrier
and providing a qualified, licensed driver) remains constant regardless of whether the motor
carrier is required to have operating authority.
If the Court assumes, for the sake of argument, that all factors (excepting operating

authority) support a determination that an owner-operator hauling in interstate commerce and
an owner-operator hauling in intrastate commerce are each engaged in an independent
business, but neither have operating authority, the application of Giltner would result in a
different outcome for each owner-operator. Under Giltner, the owner-operator servicing an
interstate motor carrier would be deemed to be an employee for purposes of the Idaho
Employment Security Act and the owner-operator servicing an intrastate motor carrier would
not be considered an employee for purposes of the Idaho Employment Security Act. This
disparate outcome would occur because Giltner does not apply to the owner-operator servicing
an intrastate motor carrier. Neither the motor carrier nor the owner-operator is required to have
operating authority for intrastate loads.
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The federal government distinguishes between owner-operators who are involved in
interstate commerce and those who are involved in intrastate commerce, requiring the former
to have operating authority but not the latter. Of necessity, the federal government makes this
distinction because of the limits of its power and authority under the commerce clause. The
question relevant to the matter before the Court is whether an owner-operator should be
classified differently for purposes of the Idaho Employment Security Act based on a single,
dispositive test of whether the owner-operator has operating authority. Such a distinction is
not justified. If an owner-operator can have an independently established business without
operating authority (because it hauls intrastate), operating authority should not be a dispositive
test and Giltner should be reversed.
4.

The Court's logic in Giltner would reclassify independent contractors across
industries as employees because nearly all independent contractors rely on
their contracting partners for some element essential to their work.

The Court's logic in Giltner would render nearly every independent contractor an
employee because almost all independent contractors rely on their contracting partners to
supply some essential element, without which the independent contractors cannot perform their
work.
The Court's logic is captured in the following quotation from the Giltner opinion:
All of the reclassified drivers operated under Giltner's DOT authority.
They had no authority to operate without this; they were solely dependent
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on Giltner's DOT authority to haul goods in interstate commerce.
Therefore, as a matter of law, they could not be engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession or business.
145 Idaho at 420, 179 P.3d at 1176.
A detailed analysis did not accompany the above-quoted excerpt, but the Court's
reasoning appears to be that the reclassified owner-operators could not have an independently
established business because the owner-operators relied on Giltner to supply a purportedly
essential prerequisite to the owner-operators' work.
Imagine the impact such reasoning would have if applied to other industries. For
example, in the home building industry, a home builder typically engages a general contractor
to secure a building permit and build a house. The general contractor engages various
subcontractors, such as carpenters, electricians, plumbers, and masons, to carry out the labor
of building the house. The building permit held by the general contractor constitutes essential
authority without which the subcontractors cannot do their work. Are the subcontractors, as
a matter oflaw, not engaged in an independently established business because they do not have
their own building permit but instead rely on the general contractor's building permit?
Assume, for the sake of argument, that by all other measures the subcontractors are
engaged in an independently established business. Are all other considerations to be trumped
by the fact that the general contractor supplies essential authority without which the
subcontractors cannot do their work? After Giltner, this is precisely the cloud that hangs over
all independent contractors.
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In the home building industry, and in the construction industry generally, a permit
obtained by the general contractor is sufficient to cover the work of the subcontractors, and the
subcontractors do not need to obtain their own building permit. Likewise, in the trucking
industry, a motor carrier's operating authority is sufficient to cover the work of an owneroperator, and the owner-operator does not need to obtain its own operating authority to carry
out the owner-operator's business.

5.

Giltner made a single factor, a factor that is less indicative of actual
independence than other longstanding factors, dis positive as to whether an
owner-operator is engaged in an independently established business.

In truth, no worker is completely independent in the performance ofthe worker's labors.
Every worker, be it an employee or an independent contractor, depends on the work of others
to enable the worker to complete a job. Co-dependence is the hallmark of a modem economy.
The statutory exemption to the general rule that remuneration paid to a worker is subject to
unemployment tax recognizes that some workers are more independent than others. See Idaho
Code§ 72-1316(4 ). Presumably, the Idaho Legislature enacted the exemption, with its control
and independence prongs, because independent contractors who meet both prongs are in
business for themselves and less vulnerable than employees for their livelihood. That being
the case, the question of whether a worker is independent should be analyzed giving greatest
weight to those factors that make a worker less vulnerable for the worker's livelihood and
should not be resolved based on a single, dispositive factor.
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For over forty years, this Court has evaluated a worker's independence using several
factors, such as the right to hire subordinates, ownership of major items of equipment, whether
payment was for the result or for the performance of work, and whether the worker incurs
substantial professional expenses that are not reimbursed. See National Trailer Convoy, Inc.

v. Employment Sec. Agency of Idaho, 83 Idaho 247, 360 P.2d 994 (1961); Hammond v.
Department of Employment, 94 Idaho 66, 480 P.2d 912 (1971). In each instance, greatest
weight has been given to those factors that are most indicative of actual independence.
Respondent's brief herein notwithstanding, the Idaho Department of Labor ("DOL'')
has heretofore urged the use of fifteen factors to determine whether a worker is engaged in an
independently established business. See ID APA 09.01.35.112. One of those factors is whether
there exists "special licensing or regulatory requirements for performance of work." ID APA
09. 01.3 5 .112. For the sake of argument, ITA assumes that this factor encompasses operating
authority in the trucking context. If the DOL had intended that a disproportionate amount of
weight be given to this factor or for any single factor to be dispositive, presumably it would
have said so in IDAPA 09.01.35.112.
In its Decision and Order in the present matter, the Commission weighed each of the
fifteen IDAPA factors in light of the facts and determined that a strong majority of the fifteen
factors pointed to Westem's owner-operators being properly classified as independent
contractors and not employees. (R. at 22-37 .) Notwithstanding such finding, the Commission
went on to say that, as a matter oflaw, per Giltner, the owner-operators in this case had to be
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classified as employees and not independent contractors because they operate under Western' s
operating authority. (R. at 35.) The Commission acknowledged that the majority holding in
Giltner mandated such reclassification despite the existence of"significant evidence to suggest

that the owner[-]operators in this case are independent contractors", a result that the
Commission deemed "unreasonable ... particularly to [Western] in this case." (R. at 35.)
The factor the Court made dispositive in Giltner (i.e., whether the owner-operator has
its own operating authority) is irrelevant after understanding the correct nature of an owneroperator's business, is far outweighed by the importance of the other factors, and is not
consistent with the explicit language ofIDAPA 09.01.35.112. That being the case, Giltner is
manifestly wrong, and the Court should therefore reverse the holding in Giltner and affirm the
application of the multi-factor test.
B.

GILTNER SHOULD BE OVERTURNED BECAUSE, OVER TIME, IT HAS
PROVEN UNJUST OR UNWISE.
1.

Due to recent changes in federal law (i.e., MAP-21), motor carriers are
prohibited from tendering freight to an owner-operator to haul freight
under the owner-operator's operating authority.

Historically, motor carriers could subcontract loads to other motor carriers (including
an owner-operator that had its own operating authority). On July 6, 2012, President Obama
signed into law P .L. 112-141, the Moving Ahead for Progress in the 21st Century Act ("MAP21"). Pursuant to MAP-21, effective as of October 1, 2013, an owner-operator who hauls
loads for a motor carrier that does not have brokerage authority (which is separate and distinct

19 -

AMICUS CURIAE BRIEF

from the operating authority at issue in Western and Giltner) will have to haul such loads under
the motor carrier's operating authority-regardless of whether the owner-operator has its own
operating authority.
This change effectively prohibits a motor carrier from subcontracting loads to other
motor carriers (i.e., an owner-operator may not haul a load under its operating authority unless
it receives the load directly from the shipper or a broker). As a result, the distinction that the
Court made in Giltner between owner-operators that have operating authority and owneroperators that do not have operating authority is no longer applicable, if it ever was.
Therefore, Giltner should be reversed.
2.

Public policy considerations support the regulatory requirement of motor
carriers holding the operating authority under which their owner-operators
operate.

The public policy advantages of having motor carriers hold operating authority under
which their owner-operators operate, some of which are summarized in Appellant's Reply
Brief, include the following:
a.

The structure of a motor carrier holding operating authority eases

administrative burdens on the Department of Transportation by decreasing the number of
applications it must process and records it must maintain.
b.

The structure of a motor carrier holding operating authority creates an

additional layer of protection for shippers and the general public because the motor carrier acts
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as another checkpoint for compliance of the owner-operators with the safety regulations
applicable to the owner-operators' trucks and drivers.
c.

By securing and holding operating authority, in addition to performing

other administrative tasks (e.g., contracting for loads, obtaining trip permissions, dispatching
loads, collecting taxes, and filing regulatory paperwork), the motor carrier eases the
administrative burdens on owner-operators, which encourages owner-operators to continue to
work in an industry in which the owner-operators' services are in high demand.
d.

The owner-operator model is beneficial to the shipper because it provides

clear recourse against the motor carrier with whom it has a contractual relationship, instead of
forcing it to pursue an owner-operator with whom it has no such relationship.
In contrast to the foregoing, no public policy advantages to an owner-operator
maintaining its own operating authority have been identified in this proceeding. Other than
referencing the general benefits of the principle of stare decisis, Respondent points to no
persuasive public policy reasons for forcing owner-operators to obtain operating authority in
order to be exempted from the Idaho Employment Security Act.
3.

Imposing unemployment tax on owner-operators is a burden without an
equivalent corresponding benefit and may negatively impact Idaho's
economy.

If Giltner were to be upheld (i.e., if unemployment taxes were to be imposed on the

remuneration paid to any owner-operator operating under a motor carrier's operating
authority), the Court should ask whether there would be a corresponding benefit equivalent to
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the burden such tax would place on the motor carriers and the reclassified owner-operators.
It is clear from the record in Western that the owner-operators in question consider themselves

unequivocally to be independent contractors. (R. at 24.) All but three of them live outside the
State ofldaho. (Appellant's Br. at 4.) It seems unlikely that the owner-operators would seek
unemployment benefits from the State of Idaho upon the termination of their contract with
Western. In addition, owner-operators that stay true to their independent contractor status
generally do not seek such benefits. While the imposition of unemployment taxes in this case
would certainly enhance the bottom line of the state's employment security fund, the supposed
protection to the putative employees is likely to be largely illusory.
Unless Giltner is overturned, the owner-operator model will change in Idaho and not
for the better. Motor carriers will pass these additional taxes on to owner-operators either
directly through charge-backs to their weekly settlements or indirectly through a reduction in
the compensation paid to owner-operators. Alternatively, motor carriers may conclude that
the risk of additional tax liabilities resulting from Idaho's inconsistent treatment of owneroperators is too high, and therefore, choose not to pursue the owner-operator model or may
simply choose to relocate outside ofldaho. In either case, the owner-operators lose. This loss
will likely effect an outcome that is the opposite of what the Court intended (i.e., the loss will
result in (i) less money in the state coffers because motor carriers are not engaging owneroperators or are relocating outside of Idaho and therefore not paying unemployment taxes on
their compensation, and (ii) more owner-operators seeking unemployment benefits because the
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motor carriers are not engaging them or because the changes in the model as a result of the
additional taxes make the model unworkable).
Failure to reverse Giltner also may have a potentially negative impact on the general
public as well. Motor carriers already operate on extremely slim margins. If Giltner is not
overruled, the motor carriers will likely increase rates with their shippers to try to capture any
increased expenses that cannot be passed through to the owner-operators. Shippers in tum will
raise their prices to the general public. Upholding Giltner will have an adverse effect on the
owner-operator model, which may increase the cost of doing business and living in the State
of Idaho.
4.

Preserving an owner-operator's status as an independent contractor serves
legitimate business purposes and is not a ploy to dodge taxes levied on
employees.

The longstanding business model of motor carriers engaging owner-operators who are
independent contractors provides proven benefits to the motor carrier and the owner-operator
alike. From the motor carrier's perspective, the independent contractor relationship saves on
equipment and capital costs, provides a mature, experienced workforce, and promotes
significant operational flexibility. From the owner-operator's perspective, the relationship
offers the opportunities and benefits of owning and operating his or her own business and the
financial, lifestyle, and entrepreneurial advantages not available to employee drivers. See
James C. Hardman, The Employment Classification Issue in the Motor Carrier Industry, 37
Transp. L.J. 27 (2010); Gregory M. Feary, Independent Contractor Employment
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Classification: A Survey ofState and Federal laws in the Motor Carrier Industry, 35 Transp.
L.J. 139 (2008).
The independent contractor business model serves the interests of both motor carriers
and owner-operators. As discussed above, the model did not spring from a dubious desire to
avoid employment-related taxes, but rather as a means of complying with federal regulations,
promoting public policy aims, and maximizing efficiencies for both motor carriers and owneroperators. In fact, evidence suggests that both motor carriers and owner-operators are better
off not participating in unemployment insurance and other employee benefit programs. As one
eminent industry legal scholar has observed:
Contrary to the flawed concept that drivers are forced to become
independent contractors rather than [company drivers], alternative
opportunities exist in the industry.

The trucking industry has, in the past twenty-five years, been one
in which relatively all motor carriers operated on low profit margins, if
not incurring losses, and thus motor carriers have had need to control the
costs of operations.
While the use of independent contractors allows motor carriers to
avoid employee benefits costs, unemployment and workers'
compensation insurance, as well as unemployment taxes, it should not be
assumed that independent contractors are necessarily "worse off' from
an economic standpoint.
Independent contractors receive contract payments which reflect
a substantial amount over a [company driver] basic wage and benefits.
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If the monetary rewards as an independent contractor were so
"bad" as opposed to that of a [company driver], the contractor has the
opportunity to switch to an employee position, and this has not been
occurring or, if so, to an insignificant degree.

Hardman, supra, at 28-29 (citations omitted).
In exchange for forgoing unemployment and other benefits, the owner-operator receives
higher compensation. By choosing to operate under this model, the owner-operator accepts
the benefits and the risks of operating as an independent contractor, which the owner-operator
typically acknowledges in the lease agreement with the motor carrier. Permitting an owneroperator to take advantage of higher compensation during an engagement with a motor carrier
and then allowing that owner-operator to take advantage of unemployment benefits when the
engagement ends is unjust not only to the motor carrier, but to other owner-operators who
maintain their status as independent contractors and do not claim such benefits.
The business model of an owner-operator hauling loads under a motor carrier's
operating authority has been an industry standard for decades. That model was recently further
entrenched by the passage of MAP-21. As outlined above, having an owner-operator haul
under a motor carrier's operating authority serves the interests of the parties to the hauling
transaction and the public. No comparable benefits to an owner-operator hauling under its own
operating authority have been suggested in this proceeding.
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Giltner unjustly penalizes motor carriers and owner-operators for complying with the
leasing regulations, which require owner-operators to haul under the authority of a motor
carrier. This penalty undermines the mutual benefits of the owner-operator model. Giltner
should be reversed given the unjust and unwise nature of its impact on the owner-operator
model.

C.

GILTNER SHOULD BE OVERTURNED BECAUSE REVERSAL WOULD
VINDICATE PLAIN, OBVIOUS PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND REMEDY A
CONTINUED INJUSTICE.
1.

Overturning Giltner would vindicate decades-old principles of law and
dispel confusion with regard to evaluating the independence prong.

As noted above, for over forty years, the Court has determined whether workers are
engaged in an independently established business by weighing multiple factors. The Court
used the multi-factor approach under both the common law test and statutory test to determine
whether a worker was an independent contractor. The factors most often considered were
whether the worker had authority to hire subordinates, whether the worker owned major items
of equipment, and whether either party would be liable to the other for peremptory termination
of the business relationship. See National Trailer, 83 Idaho at 253, 360 P.2d at 998; Swayne

v. Dept. of Employment, 93 Idaho 101, 105, 456 P.2d 268, 272 (1969); Hammond, 94 Idaho
at 68, 480 P.2d at 914-15; Dept. ofEmploymentv. Bake Young Realty, 98 Idaho 182, 186, 560
P.2d 504, 508 (1977); JR. Simplot Co. v. State Dept. ofEmployment, 110 Idaho 762, 765, 718
P.2d 1200, 1203 (1986).
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Over the years, other factors have also been considered by the Court, such as whether
the worker was paid for a result (or by the job) or simply for the performance of work, and
whether the worker incurs substantial out-of-pocket professional expenses that are not
reimbursed. National Trailer, 83 Idaho at 253, 360 P.2d at 998; Hammond, 94 Idaho at 68,
480 P.2d at 914-15; Bake Young, 98 Idaho at 186, 560 P.2d at 508. When the DOL
promulgated its aforementioned fifteen-factor test for the independence prong in 1999, it
included all of these factors as well as others.
In the present case, absent Giltner, if the independence prong is analyzed by weighing
either the multiple factors stated in Swayne and its progeny or the fifteen IDAPA factors
promulgated by the DOL, the result would be the same. As the Commission intimated,
Westem's owner-operators will be found to be independent contractors. (R. at 28-35.)
If the majority in Giltner evaluated the independence prong using the longstanding

multi-factor test, this analysis was not included in the Court's decision. See Giltner, 145 Idaho
at 420, 179 P.3d at 1076. To ITA's knowledge, Giltner represents the only time the Court has
reached a conclusion on the independence prong without reference to multiple factors. At the
same time, the Court gave no indication that the multi-factor analysis of the independence
prong is dead. Reversing Giltner would unequivocally affirm the decades-old multi-factor
analysis. At the same time, it would dispel uncertainty by confirming that Hammond, a case
where owner-operators were found to be engaged in an independently established business
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even though they did not have their own operating authority, is still good law. See Hammond,
94 Idaho 66, 480 P.2d 912.

2.

Overturning Giltner would be a step toward remedying an injustice on the
trucking industry resulting from needlessly diverse, confusing, and
conflicting laws and rules that govern the industry.

In deciding the independence prong in Giltner solely on the basis that the reclassified
drivers operated under Giltner' s operating authority, the Court created a new rule that is unique
among the states. While courts in a few states have considered operating authority as one of
several factors indicative of independence, ITA knows of no other court in any other state that
has elevated operating authority to be determinative on its own. In fact, Giltner conflicts with
longstanding rules oflaw in Idaho and its sister states for evaluating a worker's independence.
IDAPA 09.01.35.112.04; Excell Construction, Inc. v. Idaho Dept. of Commerce and Labor,
145 Idaho 783, 786-90, 186 P.3d 639, 643-47 (2008); National Trailer, 83 Idaho at 253, 360
P.2d at 998; Hammond, 94 Idaho at 68, 480 P.2d at 914-15.
Upholding Giltner and its new rule with regard to owner-operator independence would
further the diversity oflaw and regulation that plagues the trucking industry in Idaho. Giltner
creates confusion in Idaho because it is not consistent with IDAPA 09.01.35.112. Mr. Feary
has observed that "there is an inherent conflict between the interstate nature of the trucking
business and the intrastate application ofworkers' compensation and unemployment tax laws."
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Feary, supra, at 140. The result is an adverse effect on small businesses. Mr. Hardman has
noted that:
The federal and state governments are responsible for the problem
that exists in employment classification by passing so many diverse laws
and regulations related to employment that it is an overwhelming burden
on smaller businesses.
This contradictory legislative and administrative action accounts
for the morass of confusing and conflicting decisions that are rendered
under such laws and regulations.
Hardman, supra, at 28.
Motor carriers and owner-operators are already faced with navigating the many diverse
laws referenced above by Mr. Hardman and the other laws referenced herein. Giltner creates
one more level of uncertainty and complexity for the players in the transportation industry
because Giltner creates a test that is inconsistent with the existing laws in Idaho. This
inconsistency is unjust to owner-operators and motor carriers in Idaho. Overruling Giltner and
eliminating the confusion and conflict created thereby would remedy this injustice.
3.

Giltner represents a divergence from the efforts of other states to protect the
owner-operator model and results in a continuing injustice upon the motor
carriers and owner-operators in Idaho.

ITA urges the Court to review Mr. Peary's and Mr. Hardman's recent surveys of the
laws of the 48 contiguous United States on the subject of employment classification in the
motor carrier industry. See Feary, supra, at 139; Hardman, supra, at 27. The referenced
surveys describe three basic approaches that states have taken in determining whether owner-
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operators are independent contractors for purposes of unemployment tax laws. Fourteen states
have enacted owner-operator exemptions within their unemployment tax statute. Feary, supra,
at 149-50. Another group of at least seventeen states, including Idaho, has enacted a two- or
three-prong statutory test for determining employment status. Id. at 150-51. A third group
of states subscribes to common law analyses that vary from state to state but typically involve
the weighing of multiple factors. Id. at 152-53.
Instead of continuing to rely on the multi-factor test and protecting the owner-operator
model, or at least the status quo, Giltner has made Idaho an outlier among the states with
respect to this issue. If the Court fails to overturn Giltner, the Idaho Legislature should follow
the fourteen states that have added a specific exemption for owner-operators and include such
an exemption in the Idaho Employment Security Act, which would correct the injustice that

Giltner has imposed on motor carriers and owner-operators in Idaho.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated herein, Giltner should be overruled because it is manifestly
wrong, it has proven to be unjust and unwise, and reversing it would vindicate obvious
principles of law and remedy a continued injustice.

Without Giltner to obstruct the

Commission's view of the facts of this case, it appears the Commission would have ruled in
favor of Western.
Given that Giltner should be overruled for the reasons stated herein, ITA requests the
Court to (i) find that Western's owner-operators are independent contractors for purposes of
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the Idaho Employment Security Act, and (ii) hold as a matter of law that operating authority
is not a dispositive factor in determining whether an owner-operator is engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, profession, or business.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 30th day of August, 2013.
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